Random thoughts on the human condition and computer mediated measurement of society.
Sunday, October 21, 2007
Existential anthropology?
Can it be done? How do you talk about a culture (or whatever) when you reject the notion that humans (Dasein) can "be" "something"? When the "forms of life" might be as arbitrary as the word for "cat"?
I have this same problem in psychology, but let me state that there can be no "existential" anthropology. Anthropology, just like any other "science" that examines particular beings (in this case, culture), is inherently existentiel, not existential.
Yes, in Heidegger's understanding (and that is where we are supposedly getting the term "existential"), the particular sciences are existentiel in nature; only fundamental ontology is existential. Yes, we can apply existential ontology to the existentiel sciences (or particular fields of study), but such is still an existentiel work. Just a minor issue of word use (or ab-use).
As for what you might do, I would suggest the work of Tim Ingold, particularly his Perceiving the Environment. If you are interested in philosophy and anthropology, he's an excellent source.
Well, Heidegger would obviously resist the label 'existential-anthropology' just as strongly as he rejected existentialism. The pivot of criticism would turn against the very conception of anthropology as departing on a fixed conception of 'human' existence. Taking a definite standpoint on what it means to exist is precisely what an existential-anthropology seems to contradict; Heidegger doesn't first think of us as humans, and then as existing.
Since existence precedes any determinations on the kind of beings which we are, any attempt at assigning in advance existence as something that belongs to a particular being (in this case 'human being') seems to relapse into the traditional mistake of positing existence as a mere property or process belonging to some subject. These are the familiar criticisms which drive Heidegger away from Cartesianism and all scientific conceptions of existence posited from Vorhanden points of view.
I think Dreyfus doesn't quite get the extremity of this Heideggerean view; he posits that some cultures might have (for the early Heidegger) not had an understanding of Being (the Japanese, for instance). But I find Heidegger in direct continuity with his later thought: Dasein is ontologically determined by existence prior to any properly ontological apophantic (assertoric) determinations. The entire point of Being and Time is not to say we all share the same understanding of being- an understanding of being is of necessity pre-ontological, thereby ensuing that all possible configurations amongst cultures, languages and conventions run against a background of interpretion of being.
IN this sense, the 'understanding' of being which lurks in the background of our practices is not tantamount to a uniform set of conventions shared by a particular culture; but more broadly still to the inherent interpretative stand that Dasein always takes on its own being (which is not to say it conceptualizes about its own subjectivity).
Thus, I find the expression 'existential anthropology' as somewhat oxymoronic; it on the one hand pressuposes that existential analysis should precede any determinations on beings, while at the same time fixes the point of departure as coming from the 'anthropos'- man.
The problem is that if uses 'man' to mean something like Dasein, then we pretty much take 'anthropology' to be something quite different. As for the actual possibility of carrying forth such an analysis; I think one can attempt similar explanations to the ones of Merleu Ponty, Gadamer and Heidegger make on different areas (aesthetic experience in different times, perception, etc). But these have been for the most part fleshed out already, at least to the point of interest. Other attempts have been made to make a 'phenomenology of architecture', for instance, but I have no idea as to how those turned out.
First of all let me say that I am pleased that this post is actually generating a discussion!
I am a bit surprised by the turn it is taking, and I blame myself for not knowing how to pose the question I am really interested in: How, as a practicing anthropologist/ ethnographer, do I use the insights on Dasein as existential being provided by Heidegger? And how do I explain that to a sociologist or policy-maker, firmly grounded in a Laplacian view of attribute/ entity/ initial condition view?
I use the term of "anthropology" not as a science (and the discipline generally disavows the science label too), but rather as "the *study* of what is human but not universal" - the residual after you take away philosophy. We can study humanity without assuming entity/ attribute (existentiel) frameworks -- at least I hope. As in Kant's anthropology.
Are you proposing that only fundamental ontology can take on existential questions? Don't problems of existentiality impact the daily lives of whoever? How do we deal with that?
As for Gadamer and Merleau Ponty - great guys, and I need to deal with Gadamer more. MP seems interesting but not that useful, though I don't know his work beyond a few weeks with a reader. Could you explain "fleshed to the point of interest" a little bit more? I am not familiar with later H at all (and barely conversant with early H, really).
I realize that Heidegger critiqued the notion that there is a set of ontic traits that define humanness, but rather that the only uniquely human "trait" is that we take a stand on ourselves. So we don't really need to clarify that anymore. (Not that he is the end-all, but I think we all have read Dreyfus).
It also doesn't really matter whether Heidegger thought the Japanese or the Oogah-Boogahs didn't have this self interpreting thing; that's just racist and stupid and better left unmentioned.
I realize that my subjects share this self-stancing, and I am trying to figure out how to deal with that in the future.
Apologies if that is incoherent and/ or amateurish. I really should get back to entering ontic data on the lifecourse...
I'll briefly answer to your latest comment for now, particularly to the following questions:
(1) How can one use Heidegger's work in anthropology? (2) Can only fundamental ontology take on existential questions?
The answer to (1) will entirely depend on your purposes, of course. What Heidegger may contribute to anthropology is above all related to the question of how it is that we deal with different entities in the world.
If we see a little kid in India picking up a cat, does it merely suffice to say 'he picked up a cat, the word for which is x'? I think Heidegger's main contribution in this regard to to render realism about natural kinds as somewhat meaningless; similar to what Quine performed in his examples of rabbits vs. rabbit stages.
If what comes before the determination of entities into categorial predicates is a familiar dealing with them, then we arrive at the view that there aren't context-independent descriptions of these entities which might be transitive from language to language, and which might share the same conditions of possibility.
This is not to say that trans-cultural communication is possible on the basis of shared similar practices, but only that there isn't an ontological correspondence between categorial determinations of entities. So, in the abovementioned examples, a 'cat' would not be coextensive semantically with the Indian word. Heidegger resists the temptation to say that there's an object behind words or concepts which are ultimately what is shared (standard representationalism; the Fregean, or Russellian view; naturalism, realism about natural kinds, etc).
There isn't a singular set of assertoric statements which could be taken as constitutive for all intraworldly entities; there is at most different ways of comporting towards entities which open different horizons for how entities get determined.
The priority of practice over theory, in Heidegger, ultimately means that all theory is based on lived practice and not on tacit beliefs or unspoken descriptions; the descriptions will be always in direct correspondance to the way entities are understood in everyday engaged agency, within a contextual whole (which Heidegger calls circumspection).
We thereby drop the attempts for cultural translatability, and we may replace it with a reflection on how entities get disclosed according to specific practices. Foucault practices that very sort of Heideggerean anthropology.
(2)Definately not. Fundamental ontology, as Heidegger conceived of it, basically fell apart after Being and Time- it supervened on the possibility of mapping out the uniform horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being (transculturally even). Heidegger thought this was Time, but it later proved to be impossible to make that reduction. Still, his later historical analyses, while hard to categorize philosophically, are all in clear continuity with his earlier thesis that existence is Dasein's essence (whoness precedes whatness). Gadamer and Derrida also follow this sort of method without ever engaging in fundamental ontology.
Oh, and about the transition from practice to theory; these will be determined according to the degrees of availability and unavailability of entities ready-at-hand. This is all in Being and Time and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.
7 comments:
I have this same problem in psychology, but let me state that there can be no "existential" anthropology. Anthropology, just like any other "science" that examines particular beings (in this case, culture), is inherently existentiel, not existential.
So what if you are committed to studying "anthro" -- does the act of studying commit you to "existentiel"?
I guess I don't mean "What do other anthropologists do?" but "How might I do anthropology?"
Yes, in Heidegger's understanding (and that is where we are supposedly getting the term "existential"), the particular sciences are existentiel in nature; only fundamental ontology is existential. Yes, we can apply existential ontology to the existentiel sciences (or particular fields of study), but such is still an existentiel work. Just a minor issue of word use (or ab-use).
As for what you might do, I would suggest the work of Tim Ingold, particularly his Perceiving the Environment. If you are interested in philosophy and anthropology, he's an excellent source.
Well, Heidegger would obviously resist the label 'existential-anthropology' just as strongly as he rejected existentialism. The pivot of criticism would turn against the very conception of anthropology as departing on a fixed conception of 'human' existence. Taking a definite standpoint on what it means to exist is precisely what an existential-anthropology seems to contradict; Heidegger doesn't first think of us as humans, and then as existing.
Since existence precedes any determinations on the kind of beings which we are, any attempt at assigning in advance existence as something that belongs to a particular being (in this case 'human being') seems to relapse into the traditional mistake of positing existence as a mere property or process belonging to some subject. These are the familiar criticisms which drive Heidegger away from Cartesianism and all scientific conceptions of existence posited from Vorhanden points of view.
I think Dreyfus doesn't quite get the extremity of this Heideggerean view; he posits that some cultures might have (for the early Heidegger) not had an understanding of Being (the Japanese, for instance). But I find Heidegger in direct continuity with his later thought: Dasein is ontologically determined by existence prior to any properly ontological apophantic (assertoric) determinations. The entire point of Being and Time is not to say we all share the same understanding of being- an understanding of being is of necessity pre-ontological, thereby ensuing that all possible configurations amongst cultures, languages and conventions run against a background of interpretion of being.
IN this sense, the 'understanding' of being which lurks in the background of our practices is not tantamount to a uniform set of conventions shared by a particular culture; but more broadly still to the inherent interpretative stand that Dasein always takes on its own being (which is not to say it conceptualizes about its own subjectivity).
Thus, I find the expression 'existential anthropology' as somewhat oxymoronic; it on the one hand pressuposes that existential analysis should precede any determinations on beings, while at the same time fixes the point of departure as coming from the 'anthropos'- man.
The problem is that if uses 'man' to mean something like Dasein, then we pretty much take 'anthropology' to be something quite different. As for the actual possibility of carrying forth such an analysis; I think one can attempt similar explanations to the ones of Merleu Ponty, Gadamer and Heidegger make on different areas (aesthetic experience in different times, perception, etc). But these have been for the most part fleshed out already, at least to the point of interest. Other attempts have been made to make a 'phenomenology of architecture', for instance, but I have no idea as to how those turned out.
First of all let me say that I am pleased that this post is actually generating a discussion!
I am a bit surprised by the turn it is taking, and I blame myself for not knowing how to pose the question I am really interested in: How, as a practicing anthropologist/ ethnographer, do I use the insights on Dasein as existential being provided by Heidegger? And how do I explain that to a sociologist or policy-maker, firmly grounded in a Laplacian view of attribute/ entity/ initial condition view?
I use the term of "anthropology" not as a science (and the discipline generally disavows the science label too), but rather as "the *study* of what is human but not universal" - the residual after you take away philosophy. We can study humanity without assuming entity/ attribute (existentiel) frameworks -- at least I hope. As in Kant's anthropology.
Are you proposing that only fundamental ontology can take on existential questions? Don't problems of existentiality impact the daily lives of whoever? How do we deal with that?
As for Gadamer and Merleau Ponty - great guys, and I need to deal with Gadamer more. MP seems interesting but not that useful, though I don't know his work beyond a few weeks with a reader. Could you explain "fleshed to the point of interest" a little bit more? I am not familiar with later H at all (and barely conversant with early H, really).
I realize that Heidegger critiqued the notion that there is a set of ontic traits that define humanness, but rather that the only uniquely human "trait" is that we take a stand on ourselves. So we don't really need to clarify that anymore. (Not that he is the end-all, but I think we all have read Dreyfus).
It also doesn't really matter whether Heidegger thought the Japanese or the Oogah-Boogahs didn't have this self interpreting thing; that's just racist and stupid and better left unmentioned.
I realize that my subjects share this self-stancing, and I am trying to figure out how to deal with that in the future.
Apologies if that is incoherent and/ or amateurish. I really should get back to entering ontic data on the lifecourse...
I'll briefly answer to your latest comment for now, particularly to the following questions:
(1) How can one use Heidegger's work in anthropology?
(2) Can only fundamental ontology take on existential questions?
The answer to (1) will entirely depend on your purposes, of course. What Heidegger may contribute to anthropology is above all related to the question of how it is that we deal with different entities in the world.
If we see a little kid in India picking up a cat, does it merely suffice to say 'he picked up a cat, the word for which is x'? I think Heidegger's main contribution in this regard to to render realism about natural kinds as somewhat meaningless; similar to what Quine performed in his examples of rabbits vs. rabbit stages.
If what comes before the determination of entities into categorial predicates is a familiar dealing with them, then we arrive at the view that there aren't context-independent descriptions of these entities which might be transitive from language to language, and which might share the same conditions of possibility.
This is not to say that trans-cultural communication is possible on the basis of shared similar practices, but only that there isn't an ontological correspondence between categorial determinations of entities. So, in the abovementioned examples, a 'cat' would not be coextensive semantically with the Indian word. Heidegger resists the temptation to say that there's an object behind words or concepts which are ultimately what is shared (standard representationalism; the Fregean, or Russellian view; naturalism, realism about natural kinds, etc).
There isn't a singular set of assertoric statements which could be taken as constitutive for all intraworldly entities; there is at most different ways of comporting towards entities which open different horizons for how entities get determined.
The priority of practice over theory, in Heidegger, ultimately means that all theory is based on lived practice and not on tacit beliefs or unspoken descriptions; the descriptions will be always in direct correspondance to the way entities are understood in everyday engaged agency, within a contextual whole (which Heidegger calls circumspection).
We thereby drop the attempts for cultural translatability, and we may replace it with a reflection on how entities get disclosed according to specific practices. Foucault practices that very sort of Heideggerean anthropology.
(2)Definately not. Fundamental ontology, as Heidegger conceived of it, basically fell apart after Being and Time- it supervened on the possibility of mapping out the uniform horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being (transculturally even). Heidegger thought this was Time, but it later proved to be impossible to make that reduction. Still, his later historical analyses, while hard to categorize philosophically, are all in clear continuity with his earlier thesis that existence is Dasein's essence (whoness precedes whatness). Gadamer and Derrida also follow this sort of method without ever engaging in fundamental ontology.
Oh, and about the transition from practice to theory; these will be determined according to the degrees of availability and unavailability of entities ready-at-hand. This is all in Being and Time and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.
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